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COAfAfONWEALTH~SCHULZE 
In Commonwealth v. Schulze, 1 the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts overruled the lower court's decision and adjudged 
that testimony by a general practitioner concerning a defendant's 
mental condition was admissible.2 Prior to this decision, Massachu­
setts case law prohibited opinion testimony regarding a defendant's 
lack of criminal responsibility from a person who was not specialized 
in the treatment of mental diseases.3 The court in Schulze, however, 
addressed the issue of whether a general practitioner, who had ex­
amined a defendant a few days prior to a crime, could testify as to 
his observation and diagnosis of the defendant's mental condition at 
the time of treatment.4 Based on the facts in Schulze, the court con­
cluded that exclusion of a general practitioner's testimony consti­
tuted reversible error.5 The court's holding on this issue broadens 
the scope of admissible evidence allowed in a criminal trial where 
insanity is raised as a defense.6 
In 1982, Mark Schulze appealed his conviction of armed rob­
bery on the ground that the trial judge's exclusion of the testimony 
by a general practitioner, Dr. Chin, amounted to prejudicial error.7 
Defendant Schulze claimed that he was in a state of acute toxic psy­
chosis, caused by a heroin overdose, when he attempted an armed 
robbery of a Somerville pharmacy.s Thus, his sole defense was that 
he lacked criminal responsibility.9 
I. 389 Mass. 735, 452 N.E.2d 216 (1983). 
2. fd. 
3. fd. at 738-39, 452 N.E.2d at 219-20. See Commonwealth v. Boyd, 367 Mass. 
169, 182, 326 N.E.2d 320, 328-29 (1975) (defines the longstanding rule on expert testi­
mony in Massachusetts). 
4. Schulze, 389 Mass. at 739-40, 452 N.E.2d at 220. 
5. fd. at 742, 452 N.E.2d at 221. 
6. fd. 
7. fd. at 736, 452 N.E.2d at 218. The defendant also contended that if the offer of 
proof was deficient then he was thereby denied effective assistance of counsel. fd. at 738, 
452 N.E.2d at 219. 
8. fd. at 736, 452 N.E.2d at 218. 
9. fd. See Commonwealth v. McHoul, 352 Mass. 544, 549-53, 226 N.E.2d 556, 
559-62 (1967). In McHoul, the court applied the Model Penal Code approach to the 
definition of criminal responsibility: 
Section 4.01 Mental Disease or Defect Excluding Responsibility (1) A person is 
not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of 
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The defense presented a qualified psychiatrist who confirmed 
that the defendant suffered chronic characterological depression and, 
that at the time of the robbery, the defendant was in an acute toxic 
psychosis. \0 In addition to the psychiatrist's testimony, the defense 
attempted to introduce evidence from Dr. Stanley Chin, a licensed 
general practitioner who had examined the defendant during the 
week before the robbery attempt. ll It was this testimony which the 
trial court found inadmissible. l2 Chin examined Schulze on Septem­
ber 7th and l3th, 1979 and concluded that he was depressed and had 
manic tendencies. Schulze was advised to seek a psychiatric consul­
tation. 13 Although this evidence was relevant, the major issue ad­
dressed was whether such testimony was admissible. 14 
The Massachusetts appellate court adhered to the established 
Commonwealth rule that a non-specialist witness was prohibited 
from giving an opinion, based on either hypothetical circumstances 
or personal observation, regarding a defendant's mental condition at 
a time, prior to, or during a crime. 15 The court stated that "while 
most other jurisdictions permit lay witnesses to state his or her opin­
ions as to a person's mental condition, 'such opinion is severly cir­
cumscribed in Massachusetts.' Thus, the general rule in 
Massachusetts is that persons who do not qualify as experts in 
mental illness may testify only as to facts observed and may not tes­
tify as to their opinions with respect to the mental condition of 
another."l6 
The justification for this rule was thoroughly analyzed in the 
mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the 
criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements oflaw. 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
10. Schulze, 389 Mass. at 736, 452 N.E.2d at 218. 
II. Id. at 736, 452 N.E.2d at 219. 
12. Id. at 737, 452 N.E.2d at 219. The final offer of proof at trial was that Dr. Chin 
had prescribed Valium on two occasions. The supreme judicial court, however, found 
such a limited view of the offer of proof unwarranted because the defense counsel had 
indicated earlier that Dr. Chin would testify as to the defendant's "state those four or five 
days before." Id. 
13. Id. at 738, 452 N.E.2d at 219. 
14. /d. at 742, 452 N.E.2d at 221. 
15. Commonwealth v. Schulze, 14 Mass. App. Ct. 343, 346-47, 439 N.E.2d 826, 829 
(1982). Cf. Commonwealth v. Spencer, 212 Mass. 438, 99 N.E. 266 (1912). In Spencer 
the court called for a relaxation of the settled rule and allowed a family physician to give 
an opinion of a testator's sanity. The case involved the execution of a will by a person 
whose mental capacity was in question. Id. 
16. Schulze, 14 Mass. App. Ct. at 346-47, 439 N.E.2d at 829 (quoting P. LIACOS, 
HANDBOOK OF MASSACHUSETTS EVIDENCE 102 (5th ed. 1981). 
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Massachusetts case, Commonwealth v. BoydY In Boyd, the court 
stated that a trial judge should determine whether a witness is quali­
fied to offer an expert opinion on mental illness by assessing whether 
he or she has sufficient knowledge, special skills and expertise in this 
area. IS A review of the trial transcript by the supreme judicial court 
in Schulze confirmed that the judge had disallowed testimony of the 
defendant's mental condition because the doctor/witness was a gen­
eral practitioner and consequently, under the Massachusetts rule, 
unqualified to express an opinion on the issue. 19 The supreme judi­
cial court reversed the lower courts' strict adherence to the long­
standing general principle and formulated a new approach. When 
insanity is raised as a defense, a general practitioner who has ex­
amined a defendant, may now testify about the defendant's mental 
condition.20 
The new rule reflects the prevailing view in other jurisdictions 
where a similar standard of criminal responsibility is applied.21 This 
view is founded upon the conclusion that when criminal responsibil­
ity is at issue, evidence of a defendant's conduct and appearance, 
before or after the crime, are matters for the jury to decide. Addi­
tionally, if a physician is qualified to diagnose and prescribe treat­
ment for a defendant, then the physican should be allowed to testify 
concerning these conditions.22 
After applying the newly adopted rule and concluding that Dr. 
Chin's testimony was admissible, the court was required to deter­
mine whether the exclusion of the evidence constituted reversible er­
ror.23 Under Massachusetts' law, if the consumption of drugs causes 
a mental disease or defect apart from an addiction itself, a defendant 
may rely upon that mental disease or defect to support an assertion 
17. 367 Mass. 169,326 N.E.2d 320 (1975). 
18. Id. at 182, 326 N.E.2d at 328. 
19. Schulze, 389 Mass. at 737, 452 N.E.2d at 219. 
20. Id. at 738, 452 N.E.2d at 219-20. The supreme judicial court, however, noted 
in a footnote that the appeals court should not be faulted for adhering to the old rule on 
the subject. Id. at 740 n.4, 452 N.E.2d at 220 n.4. 
21. /d. at 740, 452 N.E.2d at 220. Other jurisdictions mentioned by the court in 
Schulze apply substantially the same standard of criminal responsibility as Massachu­
setts does, i.e., Model Penal Code approach. See, e.g., United States v. Hartfield, 513 
F.2d 254 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Smith, 507 F.2d 710 (4th Cir. 1974). 
22. Schulze, 389 Mass. at 740, 452 N.E.2d at 220. This "new" approach adopted 
by the supreme judicial court only relates to a general practitioner as a witness. The 
expansion of the rule does not allow a general practitioner to offer an opinion on a de­
fendant's criminal responsibility at the time of the crime. Id. 
23. Id. at 741, 452 N.E.2d at 221. 
262 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:259 
of lack of criminal responsibility.24 The court reasoned that Dr. 
Chin's testimony may have had a tendency to support the psychia­
trist's testimony regarding the issue of the defendant's chronic de­
pression.25 Although the psychiatrist's opinion as to the defendant's 
criminal responsibility was based upon the acute toxic psychosis 
caused by the heroin overdose, the jury potentially could have con­
sidered an alternate theory, i.e., severe chronic depression.26 There­
fore, exclusion of Dr. Chin's testimony, which if admitted might 
have substantially affected the jury's evaluation of the defendant's 
culpability, significantly weakened the defendant's case.27 Thus, the 
judgments against Schulze were reversed, and a new trial ordered.28 
The supreme judicial court's decision in Schulze significantly 
expands the scope of testimony admissible when criminal responsi­
bility is at issue. The court now allows opinion testimony on a de­
fendant's mental condition by a non-specialist/general practitioner 
who has examined a defendant within a reasonable time prior to or 
after the happening of a crime.29 A defendant's conduct and appear­
ance prior to a crime are factors for the jury to consider. Based on 
this premise, the new rule applied in Schulze allows a more thorough 
and complete assessment of a criminal defendant's mental condition. 
Robin L. Oaks 
24. See Commonwealth v. Sheehan, 376 Mass. 765, 769, 383 N.E.2d 1115, 1118 
(1978) (established the rules which relate to drug use and criminal responsibility). 




29. Id. at 740, 452 N.E.2d at 220. The new rule, however, does not go as far as 
other jurisdictions in which opinions as to a person's mental condition may be received 
from a lay witness who has had adequate opportunity to observe the defendant. See 
Underwood v. State, 553 S.W.2d 869 (Mo. App. 1977); Smith v. State, 502 S.W.2d 814 
(Tex. Crim. 1973). 
